



Crisis with A

Regional Outlook

POLICE REFORM IN BURMA (MYANMAR):
AIMS, OBSTACLES AND OUTCOMES

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Executive Summary

Despite all the publicity that Burma has received since the inauguration of a hybrid military-civilian parliament in 2011, and the launch of an ambitious reform program by President Thein Sein, there are some important issues which seem to have escaped serious study. It has become clear, for example, that the new government wishes not only to reinvigorate plans to expand and remodel the Myanmar Police Force (MPF), but also to give it a more distinctive civilian style and ethos, and see it take greater responsibility for some key aspects of the country's internal security. Indeed, such steps will be essential if Burma is to strengthen the rule of law and make an orderly transition to a genuine and sustainable democracy.

The armed forces (*Tatmadaw*) will remain responsible for external defence and for counter-insurgency campaigns against armed ethnic groups. However, it seems to be envisaged that as part of the broad democratisation process, the MPF will assume a greater role in terms of law enforcement and the maintenance of internal order. Already, there are more blue uniforms than green uniforms on the streets protecting VIPs and standing static guard outside diplomatic missions. The police can also be expected to play a larger part in quelling civil unrest, with the army only called upon to provide aid to the civil power during emergencies, as occurred in Arakan (Rakhine) State in 2012 and Meiktila in 2013.

To this end, the MPF is being expanded, restructured and modernised. It is already larger and more powerful than it has been since the colonial era, but the goal is a force of over 100,000 men and women, with 34

Authors Note

After the Burmese armed forces crushed a nationwide pro-democracy uprising in September 1988, Burma's official name (in English) was changed from its 1974 form, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, back to the Union of Burma, which had been adopted when Burma regained its independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in January 1948. In July 1989 the new military government changed the country name once again, this time to the Union of Myanmar. At the same time, a number of other place names were changed to conform more closely to their original pronunciation in the Burmese language. In 2008, after promulgation of a new national constitution, the country's official name was changed yet again, this time to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

The new names have been accepted by most countries, the United Nations and other major international organisations. Some governments and opposition groups, however, have clung to the old forms, largely as a protest against the former military regime's human rights abuses and its refusal to introduce a genuinely democratic system of government. In this paper the better-known names, for example Burma instead of Myanmar, Rangoon instead of Yangon and Irrawaddy instead of Ayeyarwady, have been retained for ease of recognition. Quotations and references, however, have been given as they originally appeared. Also, formal titles introduced after 1989 have been cited in their current form, such as Myanmar Army and Myanmar Police Force. Such usage does not carry any political connotations.

The armed forces have ruled Burma since 1962 but, from 1974 to 1988, they exercised power through an ostensibly elected parliament. On taking back direct control of the country in September 1988, the armed forces abolished the old government structure and created the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which ruled by decree. In November 1997, apparently on the advice of a United States public relations firm, the regime changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council. In 2008, it held a constitutional referendum, which was followed by elections in 2010. The resulting national parliament, consisting of both elected officials and non-elected military officers, first met in January 2011. A new government was installed under President Thein Sein in March that year.

After the UK dispatched troops to the royal capital of Mandalay and completed its three-stage conquest of Burma in 1885, Rangoon was named as the administrative capital of the country. It remains the commercial capital, but in October 2005 the regime formally designated the newly built town of Naypyidaw (or Nay Pyi Taw), 320 kilometres north of Rangoon, as the seat of Burmese government. When they appear in this paper, the terms Rangoon regime or in some cases simply Rangoon are used as shorthand for the central government, including the military government that was created in 1962 and reinvented in 1988. After 2005, the government is referred to as the Naypyidaw regime or simply the government.

Another term used in this paper is *Tatmadaw*. In recent years, this term has gained wide currency in English. It refers only to the armed forces, it is sometimes used in a wider context to refer to the armed forces, the national police and the intelligence services.

from 15 to 16 March 2013. It draws on research currently being conducted for a major project on the police in Myanmar. I have benefited from the generous assistance of the Griffith Asia Institute, and from personal contributions by Dr Nicholas Cheesman and Dr Nicholas Farrelly, both of the ANU. I am also grateful to the convenors of the 2013 Myanmar/Burma Update Conference for helping me commission translations of several Burmese language documents and websites, and to Thein Than Htay, Myat Khet Nyo and Ma Khin Mar Mar Kyi for the translations.

Glossary



ABRI *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
AFP

2. The Police in Burma

program and the areas where it is likely to encounter the greatest challenges, it is necessary briefly to look at its antecedents. For, as David Bayley has written:

The characteristics of contemporary police systems, such as their structure, manner of control, and image, change very slowly; they show a striking persistence over time. Events as supposedly formative as major wars, political revolutions, and social and economic transformations affect police systems surprisingly little.

At one level, this is certainly true of Burma. It is more than 150 years since a constabulary police force was established in the then province of British Burma, in a number of areas it is possible to identify strong continuities between the colonial police forces and the MPF. The military coup in 1962 completely changed the status of the police force in Burma and had a major impact on the way it has operated over the past 50 years.

Police Reform in Burma (Myanmar): Aims, Obstacles and Outcomes

4. Obstacles to Reform

Looking back over the past 15 years, the MPF can claim to have achieved a number of successes. The force has become larger, more modern and, in some respects, more capable. To a degree, at least, it has acknowledged corruption and human rights abuses in its ranks and, after a fashion, attempted to address its poor relationship with the wider community. It has also become more engaged in international efforts to combat transnational crime. It is clear, however, that the MPF still faces a number of serious problems. These may be easier to tackle, now that a new wind is blowing through the country. Even so, the transition from a highly militarised police force used to wielding unbridled power in support of a repressive regime, to a more professional and civilianised force observing the rule of law, answerable to an elected government and respected by the people, is not going to be quick or easy.

This has certainly been the case in the post-authoritarian states, notably Indonesia. development, in particular how to legitimise the political role of the armed forces. More recently, Naypyidaw has sought to do this. These Indonesian police forces have sometimes been overstated, and in important ways the modern histories of the two states and their police forces have been quite different.⁶⁵ looking at any particular country for a policing model, but Indonesia can offer a number of useful lessons in the area of security sector reform. As its experience over the past decade has shown, some of the problems currently being faced by the MPF can be tackled at the political and institutional level. Others, however, are more complex and need to be approached at the psychological and societal level.

Unsurprisingly, the key challenges to reform of the police force in Burma are closely related indeed, most overlap but six broad categories can be identified

Structure and Resources

Reflecting both its colonial antecedents and the more recent influence of the Tatmadaw, the MPF is a strictly hierarchical organisation with a strong central administration at MPF + 4 LQ 1 D \ S \ L G D Z D Q G V X E R U G L Q D W H H O H P H Q W V L Q % X U P D o V also separate municipal forces in Naypyidaw, Rangoon and Mandalay. At a lower level, there are currently 256 police townships and 16,000 villages. As the MPF grows, becomes much more diverse and

managed carefully, to avoid exacerbating political, racial and religious tensions. However,

Since 2011, Special Branch has taken full responsibility for the collection and

institution in the country⁸⁵. The 2008 constitution guarantees the armed forces a privileged position in national affairs, particularly in the security arena, and the government includes several serving and former generals starting with the president himself. At the parliamentary level, all national, State and Regional assemblies are stacked re e

effectively offered sanctuary from the civil law. Soldiers responsible for human rights abuses have rarely been charged or prosecuted. Even fewer have been punished. If this situation cannot continue.

If Thein Sein truly wants to civilianise the MPF and make it more independent, as befits a police force in a democracy, he will also need to support efforts by the MPF to develop

EDFNLQJ ZHDOWK\ JRYHUQPHQW ¹²⁵ ~~is~~ ¹²⁶ ~~the~~ ¹²⁷ ~~and~~ QG WKHLU IRUH Muslim riots in central Burma in 2013, the MPF was repeatedly accused of allowing Buddhist mobs to attack Muslims and destroy their property. The MPF claimed that, in the absence of clear orders from above, they were unable to take action. :KHWKHU RU QRW WKDW ZDV WUXH VXFK EHKDYLRXU QRW RQ EXW VHULRXVO\ XQGHUPLQHV WKH JRYHUQPHQW ¹²⁷ the rule of law.

For the reform of the MPF to be successful, the ~~distinction~~ between a military and civilian approach to policing will have to be much clearer. The police battalions will need to be imbued with the same basic ethos and outlook as other police officers. This argues for more integrated civil and paramilitary ~~police~~ training programs and a shared exposure to courses on such issues as international human rights and ~~community~~ policing. In some cases, for example at the advanced recruit and officer promotion levels, there would be real benefits in teaching ~~some~~ of these courses to mixed classes containing officers drawn from both the civil and paramilitary arms of the force. The battalions would still be recognised as a distinct part of the MPF, with special responsibilities and thus special training needs, ~~they~~ can also be encouraged to learn and practice a wide range of skills that are more consistent with the principles of policing in a democratic society.

Police Culture and Socialisation

For these and other reforms to have any real and lasting effect, ~~MPF~~ will be required to undergo a profound change in its professional culture. There are a number of HOHPHQWV WR WKLV FRYHULQJ WKH IRUFH ¹²⁸ DWLWXGH WR Burma, its understanding of its roles and responsibilities, ~~its~~ perceptions of the civil SRSXODWLRQ ¹²⁹ 5HIOHFWLQJ WKH SUHVLGHQW ¹³⁰ RZQ nWRS GRZ issued a number of directives on such matters and implemented a number of practical measures designed to encourage development of a ~~different~~ mindset in the force. Structural and procedural reforms, however, will only go so far in achieving the desired end. For cultural change requires a shift of consciousness at the psychological and societal levels. As developments over the past year ~~shows~~, such a process is bound to be very difficult and will take a long time.

As Nicholas Cheesman has pointed out, from the colonial period through to the advent of the Thein Sein government, policing in Burma has been conceived as a regime service rather than a public service¹³¹. This has encouraged a militaristic, authoritarian approach to law enforcement. Some contemporary scholars have even described Burma before 1942 as being under a kind of permanent martial law, albeit enforced by the police, rather than the armed forces¹³². 'XULQJ WKH ZDU ZLWK WKH DVLLVWDQFH RI SROLFH IRU ~~Kampala~~ ¹³³ ~~the~~ ¹³⁴ ~~police~~ ruthlessly enforced compliance with ,PSHULDO UXOH)ROORZLQJ %XUPD ¹³⁵ LQGSHQGQHFH LQ attempted to introduce a different kind of police model but this had to take second place to the exigencies of survival, in the face of multiple insurgencies¹³⁶. ¹³⁷ ~~the~~ ¹³⁸ ~~police~~ 1H :LQ ¹³⁹ 1958 s nFDUHDNHU JRYHUQPHQW ¹⁴⁰ WKH PLOLWDU\ FKDUDFWH consobously reinforced¹⁴¹. After the coup two years later, they became standard practice.

Since 1962, the police forces particularly Special Branch and the paramilitary battalions s have supported the Tatmadaw ~~in~~ maintaining security and public order. They have ¹⁴² ~~and~~ ¹⁴³ ~~the~~ ¹⁴⁴ ~~the~~ ¹⁴⁵ ~~the~~ ¹⁴⁶ ~~the~~ ¹⁴⁷ ~~the~~ ¹⁴⁸ ~~the~~ ¹⁴⁹ ~~the~~ ¹⁵⁰ ~~the~~ ¹⁵¹ ~~the~~ ¹⁵² ~~the~~ ¹⁵³ ~~the~~ ¹⁵⁴ ~~the~~ ¹⁵⁵ ~~the~~ ¹⁵⁶ ~~the~~ ¹⁵⁷ ~~the~~ ¹⁵⁸ ~~the~~ ¹⁵⁹ ~~the~~ ¹⁶⁰ ~~the~~ ¹⁶¹ ~~the~~ ¹⁶² ~~the~~ ¹⁶³ ~~the~~ ¹⁶⁴ ~~the~~ ¹⁶⁵ ~~the~~ ¹⁶⁶ ~~the~~ ¹⁶⁷ ~~the~~ ¹⁶⁸ ~~the~~ ¹⁶⁹ ~~the~~ ¹⁷⁰ ~~the~~ ¹⁷¹ ~~the~~ ¹⁷² ~~the~~ ¹⁷³ ~~the~~ ¹⁷⁴ ~~the~~ ¹⁷⁵ ~~the~~ ¹⁷⁶ ~~the~~ ¹⁷⁷ ~~the~~ ¹⁷⁸ ~~the~~ ¹⁷⁹ ~~the~~ ¹⁸⁰ ~~the~~ ¹⁸¹ ~~the~~ ¹⁸² ~~the~~ ¹⁸³ ~~the~~ ¹⁸⁴ ~~the~~ ¹⁸⁵ ~~the~~ ¹⁸⁶ ~~the~~ ¹⁸⁷ ~~the~~ ¹⁸⁸ ~~the~~ ¹⁸⁹ ~~the~~ ¹⁹⁰ ~~the~~ ¹⁹¹ ~~the~~ ¹⁹² ~~the~~ ¹⁹³ ~~the~~ ¹⁹⁴ ~~the~~ ¹⁹⁵ ~~the~~ ¹⁹⁶ ~~the~~ ¹⁹⁷ ~~the~~ ¹⁹⁸ ~~the~~ ¹⁹⁹ ~~the~~ ²⁰⁰ ~~the~~ ²⁰¹ ~~the~~ ²⁰² ~~the~~ ²⁰³ ~~the~~ ²⁰⁴ ~~the~~ ²⁰⁵ ~~the~~ ²⁰⁶ ~~the~~ ²⁰⁷ ~~the~~ ²⁰⁸ ~~the~~ ²⁰⁹ ~~the~~ ²¹⁰ ~~the~~ ²¹¹ ~~the~~ ²¹² ~~the~~ ²¹³ ~~the~~ ²¹⁴ ~~the~~ ²¹⁵ ~~the~~ ²¹⁶ ~~the~~ ²¹⁷ ~~the~~ ²¹⁸ ~~the~~ ²¹⁹ ~~the~~ ²²⁰ ~~the~~ ²²¹ ~~the~~ ²²² ~~the~~ ²²³ ~~the~~ ²²⁴ 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W KUHDWHQLQJ 7KH 03) oV FKDOOHQJH XQGHU 7KHLQ 6HLQ oV
behind that way of looking at the country and embrace completely new style of
policing, one that is in keeping with a more civilian, democratic regime in which open
dissent is accepted as normal and legitimate. The MPF needs to see itself as the
protector and servant of the community, not of the armed forces or the government.
Unless it can do that, increase its performance in the areas of law enforcement and the
maintenance of order and increase its professionalism at both an institutional and
individual level, then it will not ti3()-10(i)419G3()3(-46(a)-3(r)--3(t)5(ss)-5u5(i)4(t)5(u)- r))6(t c5()-94(o-15(p

Ultimately, police reform in Burma will depend on a high level of public trust, something which at present is sadly lacking. This is likely to be the case for some time. Symbolic and superficial measures are a good start, but substantial ~~and~~ changes are

UHTXLUHG QRWDEO\ LQ WKH IRUFH_oV SURIHVVLRQDO FXOWXU
SDUWLFXODUO\ LPSRUWDQW DW WKH ORFDO OHYHO)RU DV 'F

performance of mundane duties that the role of ~~the~~ police can have the greatest impact

LQ HLWKHU VWUHQJWKHQLO⁶³ ARJ the role can be greater GHPRFUDF\o

effort by local police to connect with their neighbourhoods. For only then will there be a real shift in community attitudes. By the same ~~token~~, as policemen live and work among

the civil population, their faults are on display for all to see. Continued reports of police

5. The Police and Political Reforms

,W LV GLIILFXOW WR HQYLVDJH WKH UHIRUP RI %XUPDov SROL

lead in turn to increased government revenues and more resources available for

6. Conclusion

Over the past decade, a broad consensus has developed about what democratic policing looks like. Analysts have identified seven basic principles: that the police force operates in accordance with the law, is regulated by a professional code of conduct, protects life by minimising the use of force, is accountable to the public, protects life and property through proactive crime prevention, safeguards human rights and dignity, and acts in non discriminatory manner. Other observers have condensed these seven principles to just three: the police force must adhere to international standards of human rights, it must maintain effective internal and external accountability, and develop a partnership with local communities to achieve public safety. Measured against all these benchmarks, Burma has made some progress since the late 1990s, and perhaps even since the advent of a new government in 2011, but it still has a very long way to go.

* LYHQ WKH KLJK OHYHO RI RSWLPLVP WKDW KDV IROORZHG 7
wide-ranging reform program, and the relaxation of controls on Burmese society, it is worth noting that, in every country where major police reform has been attempted, it has taken a long time. Inevitably, there will be setbacks and some problems will be difficult to resolve. A few observers have suggested, for example, that the excessive use of force by the M3) DW WKH PLQH VLWH DW /HWSGDGXQJ LQ PHD C
reform process and thus the reform of the MPF is stalling.⁹¹ Certainly, that incident demonstrated that old ways of thinking about political dissent in Burma die hard. Yet, it can also be argued that the public apology and parliamentary enquiry that immediately followed indicates that the government is aware of the need for change and is trying to be more responsive to public concerns. It may also be trying to demonstrate that the MPF is now being held accountable for its actions.

,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR DFNQRZOHGJH WKDW IRU DOO WKH 03)
been recognised, a range of corrective measures has been explored and, in some cases, implemented. The final outcome, however, will depend on factors that are out of the SROLFH IRUFH oV GLUHFW FRQWURO 7KHVH UHODWH PDLQO \

Notes and References



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- 15 R.H. Taylor, *The State in Myanmar* (Hurst and Co., London, 2009), 99. See also M.P. Callahan, *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003).
- 16 B.R. Pearn (ed.), *Military Operations in Burma, 1890-1892: Letters from Lieutenant J.K. Watson, K.R.*, Data Paper No.

- 46 Interview, Naypyidaw, February 2013. A few sources state that there are 133 battalions. See, for example, Myanmar Police Force (Ministry of Home Affairs, Naypyidaw, 2012), p24.
- 47 Personal communication from Rangoon, November 2011. The New South Wales Police Force in Australia boasts that women make up approximately 34 per cent of the force, with 27 per cent being sworn female police officers. NSW Police Force, *Women in Policing* at http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/150th_anniversary/evolution_of_policing/women_in_policing
- 48 This convention was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 55/25 on 15 November 2000. Burma became a state party to the convention on 30 March 2004. See United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime at <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html#Fulltext>
- 49 The Myanmar Marine Police Force was established in August 2012, at <http://www.thedailyeleven.com/national/471marine-police-established-in-myanmar> construction for prevention against the acts jeopardising the interest of State and people and sovereignty of nation, combating crimes and attempts to commit
- 50 Naypyidaw, 7 August 2012, at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/AH_NLM2012-08-08-day21.pdf
- 51 *The Irrawaddy* 26 March 2013, at <http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/30513>. In 2010, Burma hosted about 792,000 tourists, of all kinds. In 2012 there was over a million, with the number expected to rise even higher in 2013.
- 52 *Tiger Mine Research* 20 January 2013, at <http://www.tigermine.com/2013/01/20/myanmar-tourism-statistics/>
- 53 *Eleven Myanmar* 27 March 2013, at <http://elevenmyanmar.com/national/sciencetech/2938-myanmar-police-to-receive-assistance-in-setting-up-cyber-crime-division>
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- 95 The current size of the Tatmadaw is not known, but most professional Burma watchers put it at between 300,000 and 350,000. See Selth, n. Q. *Knowns and known unknowns*
- 96 Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*.
- 97 See, for example, R. H. Bruce, *Keeping the Military at Bay with Countervailing Force: 7KH 8WLOLWI RI , QGRQHVL DQ & LYLO, Occasional AD GHUV o 8VH RI* Paper No. 20 (Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, 1992).
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- 99 There is already pressure on the president to reduce defence spending to pay for VRFLDO SURJUDPV 6HH IRU H[DPSOH =LQ /LQQ n & DQ SUH DV GHIHQFH EX. *Asian Correspondent*, 17 December 2012, at <http://asiancorrespondent.com/93789/capresidentslashpoverty-rate-in-burma-as-defense-budget-highest/>
- 100 Article 339, *Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008)* p. 148.
- 101 Article 343 of the constitution appears to permit the Commander Chief to override civil law in cases affecting Defence Services personnel. *Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008)*, 148.
- 102 See, for example, *Ongoing Impunity: Continued Burma Army atrocities against the Kachin people*. DFKLQ : RPHQ o V \$VVRFLDWLRQ 7KDLQDQG & KLDQJ http://www.kachinwomen.com/images/stories/publication/ongoing_iimpunity%20.pdf
- 103 It is understood that President Thein Sein takes a personal interest in the reform of the MPF and has made a number of suggestions for further changes. Interview, Naypyidaw, February 2013.
- 104 The most senior female MP officer is a Lieutenant Colonel.
- 105 Personal communication to the author from a senior diplomat formerly based in Burma, 18 December 2012.
- 106 Sidney Jones et al. *Reforming the Indonesian Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB): An Evaluation of Human Rights Training and Assessment of Major Issues for Reform* (Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, Jakarta, 2004) also Jansen n 5HODWLRQV DPRQJ 6HFXULW \ DQG /DZ (QIRUFH , QGRQHVL DQ
- 107 6HH IRU H[DPSOH /DZL : HQJ n & IRQW WLDW XW L \$ Q H D D G K H D U W *The Irrawaddy*, 5 November 2012, at <http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/18056>
- 108 6HH IRU H[DPSOH 3K D Q H G D n . , \$ Mizzima News 18 *Mizzima News*, 18 December 2012, at <http://www.mizzima.com/special/kachinbattle-report/8590-kia-raids-police-station-3-killed.html>
- 109 It has been suggested that one reason why the police force has always been given a low priority for the issue of modern arms, is that they are too often captured by insurgents, who can then use them against the Tatmadaw. Being poorly armed, however, isolated police stations are more vulnerable to attack.
- 110 The CCDAC leads all drug enforcement efforts in Myanmar and oversees 10 sub committees.
- 111 8QGHU WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ DOO n DUPHG IRUFHV o LQ of the Defence Services. It is a moot point whether this specifically applies to the 03) o V FRPEDWCC. *Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008)*, p. 148.
- 112 See, for example, Selth, *Civil Military Relations in Burma*. ions 4B6 500.2000C>6<05a0464(a)-3(p2 BT F)4

- 114 6HH IRU H[DPSOH n0\DQPDU JRYoW usduXW, HV DFFXVDWLR
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ LQ X/5/D/1/22 Q August 2012, at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/201208/22/c_131800457.htm
- 115 The usual strength of a MPF combat battalion is about 350 officers and men, with the capacity to expand to 500 during emergencies. Instead of creating new battalions, another option for the MPF would be to increase the normal strength of existing units.
- 116 During the early days of the unrest, before the monks became involved, Special Branch officers and Union Solidarity Development Association loyalists rounded up key figures, usually at night, in an attempt to deny the protests a coherent leadership. See Andrew Selth, 'XUPD QI I JRY ROX W L R I G of DQG WKH O LQ WHU Q DW L R I O S D O n L Q u r C a K o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s', 62, no. 3 (September 2008), pp.281-297.
- 117 See, for example, Bertil Lintner, *XWUDJH %XUPD o V 6 W W H J O H I R U 'H P R F U* Lotus, London, 1990).
- 118 During the 1988 pre-democracy uprising, it was claimed by the government that it did not possess tear gas, and thus had to resort to firearms to clear WKH VWUHHWV RI SURWHVVA. *Asiaweek* 27 January 1989, at http://netipr.org/8888/interview_with_gen_saw_maung_by_asiaweek that said, the police on the streets in 2007 were armed with an extraordinary mix RI ROG DQG PRGHUQ ZHDSRQV : Support groups IRU %XUPHVH *The Guardian* 27 September 2007, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/gallery/2007/sep/27/internationalnews1#/?picture=330840149&index=14>
- 119 See, for example, detailed documents relating to MPF Battalion 6, dated 1999, in WKH DXWKRU o V SRVVHV V L R Q
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- 123 Personal communication from Rangoon, January 2011.
- 124 See, for example, *The GovHUQPHQW & RXOG + S e c t a r i a n W i l d e n e S e H G 7 K L V o D Q G (Q V X L Q J \$ E X V H V L Q H u n a n R i g h t s W a s h , D C N Y O 6 W D W H* 2012), pp.24ff at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover_0.pdf
- 125 6HH IRU H[DPSOH)UDQFLV :DGH n3URJUHVV VWRSV D GRRU o A/ *Jazeera* 4 December 2012, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/201212484532708930.html>
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- 180 %DVHG RQ LWV H[SHULHQFH ZLWK WKH 2O\PSLF *DPHV
 Security has also provided advice to Burma on the management of security at
 the Southeast Asian Games, which are to be held in Naypyidaw, Rangoon and
 Mandalay in December 2013
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- 182 The Australian courses have been held at the Australian Institute of Police
 Management in Sydney and the Australian Federal Police College in Canberra.
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 H[DP SOH 86\$, ' n%XUPD 'HPRFUDF\ KXP DQ ULJKWV DQG UX
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